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I. INTRODUCTION
Online shopping is the fastest growing use of the Internet.1
Amazon, a veritable retail giant, has played a substantial role in the
rise of ecommerce.2 As a pioneer in online shopping, Amazon has
evolved from selling only books3 to selling everything imaginable:
diapers, sushi pillow cushions, batteries, wigs for dogs, and the list
goes on.4 As consumers increasingly purchase products with the
click of a button from the comfort of their own home, brick-andmortar stores struggle to compete with giant ecommerce companies
like Amazon.5
As Amazon’s role in the retail landscape continues to evolve and
expand, it faces greater legal exposure. In recent years, Amazon has
faced product liability challenges. Product liability law governs the
“legal liability of manufacturers or sellers of goods to compensate
buyers, users, and even bystanders for damages or injuries suffered
because of defects in goods purchased.”6
Product liability law poses a challenge for Amazon because
Amazon operates an online marketplace. While Amazon sells some
of its own products on its marketplace, “a significant portion of the
products” are sold by third-party vendors.7 Recently, several courts
have considered whether Amazon should be held liable for defective
1 See Sandra M. Forsythe & Bo Shi, Consumer Patronage and Risk Perceptions in Internet
Shopping, 56 J. BUS. RES. 867, 867 (2003) (noting that “53% of Internet users report[]
shopping as a primary use of the Web”).
2 See Kate Taylor, One Statistic Shows How Much Amazon Could Dominate the Future of
Retail, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/retailapocalypse-amazon-accounts-for-half-of-all-retail-growth-2017-11 (noting that “Amazon
accounts for about 31% of all [U.S.] ecommerce purchases”).
3 See Makeda Easter & Paresh Dave, Remember When Amazon Only Sold Books?, L.A.
TIMES (June 18, 2017, 12:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-amazon-history20170618-htmlstory.html (detailing the history of Amazon and its origins as an online
bookselling site).
4 See Erik Sherman, 20 Years of Amazon’s Expansive Evolution, CBS NEWS:
MONEYWATCH (July 15, 2015, 5:15 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/20-years-ofamazons-expansive-evolution/ (explaining the expansion of Amazon’s products and noting
that “Amazon has now become a titan of retail that has branched out into many other areas”).
5 See Taylor, supra note 2 (explaining that “[t]he so-called ‘Amazon effect’ is threatening
brick-and-mortar retailers like Macy’s, Sears, and JCPenney” and noting that brick-andmortar sales grew 1.4% while online sales grew 10.1% in 2016).
6 Introduction
to
Product
Liability
Law,
HANOVER
RISK
SOLS.,
https://www.hanover.com/linec/docs/171-1748.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
7 Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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products sold by third-party vendors on Amazon’s online
marketplace. Since there is no uniform federal scheme that
addresses product liability,8 jurisdictions faced with this issue have
approached it differently. Some states have their own product
liability statutes, while other states have adopted the Restatement,
either in whole or in part.9
Plaintiffs seeking to hold Amazon liable for third-party vendors’
defective products primarily argue that Amazon is a “seller” within
the meaning of a state’s product liability statute or the
Restatement.10 If courts agree that Amazon is a seller, then Amazon
can be held liable for defective products sold by third-party vendors
on its marketplace. However, if Amazon is not a seller, then, under
current product liability law, Amazon cannot be held liable for
defective products sold by third-party vendors on its marketplace.
Plaintiffs also advance a variety of creative arguments ranging from
bailment theories11 to arguments based on the Uniform Commercial
Code.12 Similarly, Amazon has creatively claimed immunity from
liability as an online service provider under the Communications
Decency Act.13 This Note will examine these arguments in depth.
But first, Part II of this Note provides background information
on Amazon, including the Amazon Services Business Solutions
Agreement, Amazon’s “A-to-z Guarantee,” and the Fulfillment by
Amazon program. Part III of this Note examines the two approaches
to product liability law: the Restatement approach and state product
8 See HANOVER RISK SOLS., supra note 6 (“Currently, there is no uniform federal products
liability law.”).
9 See Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738 (FLW) (LHG), 2018 WL
3546197, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (applying New Jersey’s Products Liability Act); Fox v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–cv–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018)
(applying Tennessee’s Products Liability Act of 1978). But see Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (applying § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts).
10 See, e.g., Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6 (“Plaintiffs seek judgment as a matter of law that
Amazon is a ‘seller’ under the [Tennessee Products Liability] Act.”).
11 See id. at *8 (describing the plaintiffs’ alternative argument that Amazon satisfies the
definition of a seller under the Tennessee Products Liability Act because Amazon is a bailor
of the product in question).
12 See McDonald v. LG Elecs., USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533, 542 (D. Md. 2016)
(explaining that the plaintiff’s breach of implied warranty claim against Amazon must fail
because “Amazon’s role as the ‘platform’ for the third-party sales does not qualify it as a
merchant or a seller under Maryland’s UCC”).
13 See id. at 537 (explaining Amazon’s argument that dismissal is mandated under § 230
of the Communications Decency Act).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

3

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 [2019], Art. 9

1218

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1215

liability statutes’ approach. Part IV of this Note explains why
Amazon does not fall within the definition of a seller, bailor, or
merchant for purposes of liability. Lastly, Part V of this Note
examines the Communications Decency Act and explains why
Amazon should receive immunity from liability regarding defective
products sold by third-party vendors on the Amazon Marketplace.
II. BACKGROUND ON AMAZON
The volume of sellers on Amazon’s marketplace has grown
steadily over the years.14 Currently, more than one million
third-party vendors use Amazon’s marketplace to sell products,15
accounting for approximately “40 percent of Amazon’s gross
revenue.”16 To promote sales by third-party vendors, Amazon has a
“merchant integration team” whose role is “to help new sellers learn
how to list products, how to describe their products on Amazon’s
website, and how to handle order fulfillment.”17 Amazon has also
streamlined the third-party vendor listing process: To create a
listing on the marketplace, a third-party vendor simply provides a
description of the product to Amazon.18
To avoid liability, Amazon requires all third-party vendors to
agree to the Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement
(BSA).19 The terms of the BSA range from enrollment to tax matters
to password security.20 For example, section 6 of the BSA requires
third-party vendors to indemnify Amazon for any claims, losses, or

See Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *3 (observing this growth).
Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
16 Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *3.
17 See id. (detailing the role and technique of the merchant integration team).
18 See Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (noting the simple listing process).
19 See Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining
that “Amazon offers ‘a suite of optional services for sellers’” in the BSA).
20 See Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement, AMAZON SELLER CENTRAL,
https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/1791 (last visited Feb. 25, 2019) (covering
enrollment, service fee payments, receipt of sales proceeds, term and termination, license,
representations, indemnification, disclaimer and general release, limitation of liability,
insurance, tax matters, confidentiality, force majeure, relationship of the parties, use of
Amazon transaction information, suggestions and other information, modification, password
security, export, and miscellaneous topics).
14
15
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damages arising from or related to the sale of third-party products.21
Section 9 of the BSA requires third-party vendors to maintain
liability insurance naming Amazon as an insured upon reaching an
insurance threshold.22 Under the BSA, third-party vendors have
exclusive authority to determine the products they wish to sell and
the price of their products.23
Amazon also guarantees products purchased from third-party
vendors on its marketplace through its “A-to-z Guarantee.”24
Specifically, “[t]he condition of the item . . . and its timely delivery
are guaranteed under the Amazon A-to-z Guarantee.”25 However,
the A-to-z Guarantee is not a warranty and provides that Amazon
will issue a refund of the sale price only if one of three specified
conditions are met.26 Additionally, the A-to-z Guarantee carries
several restrictions which further limit its scope.27
Amazon also operates a program known as Fulfillment by
Amazon (FBA) in which sellers provide their inventory to Amazon
for storage in an Amazon fulfillment center until the products are
purchased.28 Once a product is purchased, Amazon places the

21 See id. (requiring that third-party vendors “agree to indemnify, defend, and hold
harmless” Amazon and its affiliates, including “their respective officers, directors, employees,
representatives, and agents”).
22 See id. (“If the gross proceeds from [a third-party vendors’] [t]ransactions exceed the
applicable [i]nsurance [t]hreshold during each month over any period of three (3) consecutive
months, or otherwise if requested by [Amazon], then within thirty (30) days thereafter, [the
third-party vendor] will maintain at [its own] expense . . . liability insurance.”).
23 See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (explaining
that third-party vendors select which products they want to sell, “obtain their stock from
manufacturers or upstream distributors, and set their own sales price”).
24 See About A-to-z Guarantee, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=201889410.a (last visited Feb. 25, 2019) (“The Amazon A-to-z
Guarantee protects you when you purchase items sold and fulfilled by a third-party seller.”).
25 See Buyer Dispute Program, AMAZON, https://pay.amazon.com/us/help/201751580 (last
visited Mar. 7, 2019).
26 See About A-to-z Guarantee, supra note 24 (“You may be eligible to request a refund
under the A-to-z Guarantee if any of the following apply: (1) You have not received your
package and three days have passed since the maximum estimated delivery date or the
tracking shows a delivery confirmation, whichever is sooner[;] (2) You received an order that
is different than expected and have requested a return with the seller[;] (3) You returned your
item with a trackable shipping method and the seller has not issued you a refund.”).
27 See id. (stating, for example, that the A-to-z Guarantee does not cover digital items).
28 See Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Amazon
will store the seller’s inventory.”).
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product in an Amazon-labeled box and delivers it to a shipper.29
Third-party vendors who participate in the FBA program “retain
title to their products and pay for storage space.”30 If a third-party
vendor declines to participate in the FBA program, Amazon has no
control over or interaction with the third-party vendor’s product at
any time throughout the course of the transaction.31
However, even in the absence of an FBA relationship, Amazon
retains some control over the sales process. For example, Amazon
retains the right to determine the appropriateness of the products
sold on its marketplace32 and the right to edit the content of product
listings.33 Amazon also “collect[s] money from purchasers and
direct[s] it to third-party vendors after deducting a fee.”34
Customers do not pay third-party sellers directly,35 and Amazon
continuously reminds purchasers “that they are purchasing from an
identified third party, and not from Amazon itself.”36
III. TWO APPROACHES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW
There is no uniform federal scheme of product liability.37 As a
result, states vary on their approach to product liability: some states
have adopted the Restatement in its entirety, some have adopted the
Restatement in part, and others have chosen to independently draft
a state product liability statute.38

29 See id. (explaining that “upon receipt of an order, [Amazon] will place the product in a
shipping container and deliver it to a shipper”).
30 Id.
31 See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (“Unless
the third-party vendor participates in a special ‘Fulfillment by Amazon’ program[,] . . .
Amazon has no interaction with the third-party vendor’s product at any time.”).
32 See
Offensive
and
Controversial
Materials,
Amazon,
https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/external/200164670 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019)
(“Amazon reserves the right to make judgments about whether or not content is
appropriate.”).
33 See Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (explaining that Amazon reserves the right to
“determine the appearance of product listings”).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See HANOVER RISK SOLS., supra note 6 (noting that “there is no uniform federal products
liability law”).
38 Id.
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A. RESTATEMENT

In 1965, the American Law Institute (ALI) published the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which contained a single provision,
§ 402A, focused on products liability.39 The text of § 402A reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a)
the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or
consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.40
Notably, this rule imposes strict liability—the seller is liable to
the consumer even if the seller “has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of the product.”41 At the time the ALI
published § 402A, product liability case law was not
well-developed.42 As a result, the ALI sought to propose what the
law should become, meaning that § 402A is not a true restatement
of the law. Many states quickly adopted § 402A,43 and today most

39 See Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 713 (1970) (explaining the promulgation and
acceptance of § 402A).
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: SPECIAL LIABILITY OF SELLER OF PRODUCT FOR
PHYSICAL HARM TO USER OR CONSUMER § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
41 See id. at cmt. a (noting this rule is one of strict liability).
42 See J. Denny Shupe & Todd R. Steggerda, Toward a More Uniform and Reasonable
Approach to Products Liability Litigation: Current Trends in the Adoption of the Restatement
(Third) and Its Potential Impact on Aviation Litigation, 66 J. AIR L. & COMM. 129, 131 (2000)
(emphasizing the “extensive lack of doctrinal coverage” in 1965).
43 See Titus, supra note 39, at 714 (noting that “state courts in at least 15 jurisdictions”
had adopted § 402A just five years after its promulgation).
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states have adopted it in some form.44 Due to the widespread use of
this section, the ALI published the new Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability in 1997.45 However, some states, such as
Pennsylvania, have explicitly declined to adopt the Third
Restatement.46
B. PRODUCT LIABILITY STATUTES

On the other hand, some states have declined to adopt any
version of the Restatement, opting for a state-specific product
liability statute instead.47 These states have developed their own
approach to product liability issues, which may or may not include
ideas from the Restatement. For example, New Jersey enacted the
New Jersey Products Liability Act in 1987 with the intention of
limiting the liability of sellers and manufacturers by “balanc[ing]
the interests of the public and the individual with a view towards
economic reality.”48 Courts have interpreted the Act as evincing a
legislative intent to limit the expansion of product liability law.49
Under this Act, New Jersey defines a “product seller” as:
any person who, in the course of a business conducted
for that purpose: sells; distributes; leases; installs;
prepares or assembles a manufacturer’s product
44 See Shupe, supra note 42, at 131 (“Beginning in 1965, Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts . . . was adopted by most states as the conceptual foundation of their
products liability law.”).
45 See id. (explaining that the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability “was
adopted by the diverse ALI membership without a dissenting vote at its annual meeting in
May[] 1997”).
46 See Neal Walters et al., Pennsylvania Supreme Court Declines to Adopt Restatement
(Third)
of
Torts,
BALLARD
SPAHR
(Nov.
21,
2014),
https://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2014-11-21-pennsylvaniasupreme-court-declines-to-adopt-restatement-third-of-torts.aspx
(noting
that
the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled “that the strict liability regime of the Restatement
(Second) will continue to govern”).
47 See, e.g., Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–cv–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6 (M.D.
Tenn. May 30, 2018) (discussing the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978).
48 See Sinclair v. Merck & Co., 948 A.2d 587, 593 (N.J. 2008) (quoting Zaza v. Marquess &
Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 627 (N.J. 1996)) (explaining the New Jersey legislature’s intention
for enacting the Products Liability Act).
49 See Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 654 A.2d 1365, 1369 (N.J. 1995) (“The Legislature
‘limited the expansion of products-liability law by creating absolute defenses and rebuttable
presumptions of nonliability.’” (quoting Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511, 527 (N.J.
1989))).
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according to the manufacturer’s plan, intention, design,
specifications or formulations; blends; packages; labels;
markets; repairs; maintains or otherwise is involved in
placing a product in the line of commerce.50
The New Jersey Products Liability Act serves as just one
example of a state’s approach to product liability law. Other states,
such as Tennessee, define a seller differently.51 Consequently, it is
critical that plaintiffs and Amazon are aware of the exact language
of a state’s product liability law in order to tailor their arguments
precisely to the language in the statute.
IV. COMMON ARGUMENTS FROM PLAINTIFFS AND WHY EACH OF
THEM ULTIMATELY FAIL
Plaintiffs have advanced creative arguments in an attempt to
hold Amazon liable for defective products sold by third-party
vendors.52 These arguments label Amazon a seller under the
Restatement or a state’s product liability statute, a bailor under a
state’s product liability statute, or a merchant under the Uniform
Commercial Code.53 Because Amazon does not fit within these
categorizations, it should not be held liable for defective products
sold by third-party vendors through its marketplace.
A. AMAZON IS NOT A SELLER

Regardless of the product liability law that a particular state has
adopted, plaintiffs primarily argue that Amazon falls within the
definition of a seller and thus can be held liable for third-party
vendors’ defective products.54 This argument fails for three reasons:

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (West 2018).
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (West 2018) (explaining that a seller includes any
“retailer, wholesaler, or distributor” and defining seller as “any individual or entity engaged
in the business of selling a product, whether such sale is for resale, or for use or
consumption”).
52 See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text (noting bailor and UCC theories of seller
liability).
53 See infra Part IV.A–C.
54 See, e.g., Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–cv–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6 (M.D.
Tenn. May 30, 2018) (stating that the “[p]laintiffs seek judgment as a matter of law that
Amazon is a ‘seller’”).
50
51
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(1) Amazon is a facilitator of sales, not a seller; (2) Amazon does not
exercise sufficient control over the third-party vendors’ products to
make it a seller; and (3) subjecting Amazon to strict liability for
third-party vendors’ defective products does not advance the policy
underlying product liability laws.
1. Amazon is a Facilitator
In cases involving intermediaries in the distribution process,
some courts examine whether the intermediary’s role “was that of a
facilitator rather than an ‘active participant’ in the transaction.”55
Amazon’s role in the transactions between third-party vendors and
customers is that of a facilitator.56 Amazon simply provides a
platform on which sellers can connect with potential customers in
an efficient and organized manner.57 Many other entities, such as
auctioneers, malls, credit card companies, and flea market owners,
provide services that facilitate sales. Amazon can be analogized to
these entities.58 The Amazon Marketplace, like an auction or flea
market, is a “third-party vendor’s ‘means of marketing’” while the
“fact of marketing [is] the act of the seller . . . cho[osing] the products
and expos[ing] them for sale.”59 In other words, Amazon provides “a

55 See Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738 (FLW) (LHG), 2018 WL
3546197, at *7 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (citations omitted) (discussing how the distinction
between facilitators and active participants centers on whether the intermediary party ever
“had physical control of the product [or] had merely arranged the sale”); Oscar Mayer Corp.
v. Mincing Trading Corp., 744 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that the broker—an
intermediary—could not be held strictly liable for defective peppercorns because the broker
did not exercise any degree of control over the defective product). But cf. Straley v. United
States, 887 F. Supp. 728, 744 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that the intermediary party “transcended
the role of a mere broker” by taking title to the defective product and thus exercising some
degree of control over it).
56 Anyone who purchases a product from a third-party vendor on the Amazon Marketplace
“is engaging in a transaction with the seller that Amazon is merely facilitating.” Allstate,
2018 WL 3546197, at *8.
57 See Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *7 (“Amazon’s role in the transaction was to provide a
mechanism to facilitate the interchange between the entity seeking to sell the product and
the individual who sought to buy it.”).
58 “The common thread connecting these entities is they are not liable for defects in
products sold or distributed with the help of the services they provide.” Amazon.com, Inc.’s
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 8:16–cv–02679,
2017 WL 4230197 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2017).
59 See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 500–01 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting
Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa. 1989)) (comparing Amazon’s role in
these third-party transactions to an auctioneer’s role in an auction).
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market as the agent of the seller.”60 As a facilitator in transactions
between third-party vendors and customers, Amazon is not a
“product seller.”61
2. Amazon’s Lack of Control
Courts frequently look to a seller’s control over the allegedly
defective product when determining liability.62 Notably, every
example of a seller that the Restatement provides is an entity that
owns and controls the product it later sells, even though the
Restatement does not explicitly include a title requirement.63
In transactions between third-party vendors and customers,
Amazon does not exercise sufficient control over the third-party
vendors’ products to make it a seller. Amazon does not set the price
of third-party vendors’ products64 because the BSA requires “that
sellers set their own prices, constrained only by the prices they set
in other channels.”65 Amazon also does not create the online listings
which describe and make representations about the third-party
vendors’ products.66 Further, at no point in a transaction between a
customer and a third-party vendor does Amazon hold title to the
product sold. Even if a third-party vendor participates in the FBA
program, the third-party vendor retains title to its products.67
Id. at 500.
See, e.g., Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *10 (“[W]here . . . Amazon facilitates rather
than drives the sale, it does not act as a ‘product seller’”).
62 Courts in some states, such as New Jersey, view control over the product as dispositive.
See Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *7 (explaining that “control over the product is the
touchstone that New Jersey courts have considered to determine whether a party has the
requisite involvement to be a product seller”).
63 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 1997)
(listing as a seller “manufacturers, wholesalers, . . . retailers[,] . . . lessors, bailors, and those
who provide products to others as a means of promoting . . . such products or some other
commercial activity”).
64 The BSA “does not grant Amazon the discretion to raise prices; so, unlike a
manufacturer or seller, Amazon would not be able to ‘recapture the expense of an occasional
defective product by an increase in the cost of the product.’” Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at
*11 (quoting Oscar Mayer Corp. v. Mincing Trading Corp., 744 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D.N.J. 1990)).
65 Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *8.
66 See id. (explaining that the third-party vendor must provide the content for the
product’s online listing page and noting that “Amazon’s control over the content of the page
is limited to ensuring that it fits within the website’s format and that the listing contains all
the material[s]” required by law).
67 See Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining
that third-party vendors who participate in the FBA program “retain title to their products
and pay for storage space”); see also Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *8 (noting that Amazon’s
60
61
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Throughout the sales process, decisions about whether to sell or
alter products remains with the actual title holder—that is, the
third-party vendor.68
3. The Advancement of the Policies Behind Product Liability
Laws
“Product[] liability law is a matter of public policy”69 and “is
based on concepts of fairness, feasibility, practicality, and functional
responsibility.”70 Subjecting Amazon to liability for third-party
vendors’ defective products does not advance the public policies
behind product liability law. Specifically, one policy focuses on “the
notion that the cost of injury may be overwhelming to the person
injured, but the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed to the public as a cost of doing business.”71 Imposing
liability on Amazon for defective third-party products would not
further this policy goal for three reasons. First, Amazon does not
participate in the selection of the goods to be sold.72 Second, because
of the high volume of third-party vendors on its marketplace,
Amazon cannot verify the quality of each and every product listed
on its marketplace.73 Third, Amazon has no direct impact on the
manufacturing of the products and thus cannot encourage increased
safety in products.74 For these reasons, the public policy goals
only role in the FBA program is to “locat[e], box[], and ship[] an already packaged and
assembled product”).
68 See Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *9 (explaining that Amazon is not a seller because it
lacks the basic discretion of whether to sell or alter a third-party vendors’ product).
69 See Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620, 635 (N.J. 1996).
70 See id. at 636.
71 See Donald E. Stuby, Status and Trends in State Product Liability Law: Theories of
Recovery, 14 J. LEGIS. 216, 219 (1987) (discussing one of the first decisions to explore the
rationales for applying strict liability).
72 See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (explaining
that “third-party vendors decide which products they wish to sell”).
73 See id. at 500–01 (quoting Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa.
1989)) (noting that an auctioneer, like Amazon, is “not equipped to pass upon the quality of
the myriad of products” available on its Marketplace); see also Amazon.com’s Memorandum
of Law in Support of Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 8, McDonald v.
LG Elecs. USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533 (D. Md. 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-01093-RDB) (explaining
that “no website providing an online marketplace (whether Amazon, eBay, Google, Etsy, or
others) could ever inspect and guarantee every product offered by every third-party seller”).
74 See Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 501 (analogizing the Amazon Marketplace to a
“newspaper classified ad section, connecting potential customers with eager sellers in an
efficient, modern, streamlined manner”).
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underlying product liability laws are not advanced by subjecting
Amazon to liability for third-party vendors’ sale of defective
products on the marketplace.
A plaintiff may still defend the imposition of strict liability with
the corrective justice rationale for strict liability. This rationale
places the loss on the party who created the dangerous condition,
not on the party who suffered from it.75 In this context, it might
make more sense to place the burden of loss on Amazon, a large
business, rather than on those who are injured by defective products
sold on the Amazon Marketplace.76 While there certainly is some
merit in this argument due to the innocence of the customers,77
Amazon, like the innocent customer, did not create the dangerous
condition. Amazon merely facilities the transaction and lacks
control over the defective product, meaning Amazon is not in a great
position to remediate the dangerous condition.
The current definition of “product seller” simply does not
encompass Amazon in its role in third-party vendor transactions.
Categorizing Amazon as a “product seller” with regard to its role in
third-party transactions would require an expansion of the current
definition of “product seller.” Any expansion of the definition to
include Amazon’s role should come from state legislatures, not the
judicial system because weighing policy goals is the responsibility
of the legislature.78

75 See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO
MASON L. REV. 329, 347 (2007) (“Proponents of [the] corrective justice [rationale] argue that
the law requires ‘a person whose morally culpable behavior has violated another’s autonomy
to restore the latter as nearly as possible to his or her pre-injury status.’”).
76 See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–cv–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *8 (M.D. Tenn.
May 30, 2018) (explaining the plaintiffs’ argument that “holding Amazon liable as a seller
supports the policy justifications of the [Tennessee Products Liability Act] by promoting
safety in the products sold to the public, and by placing the burden of loss on businesses like
Amazon” rather than on the injured purchaser).
77 See id. (noting that these policy justifications are somewhat persuasive for extending
liability to businesses like Amazon).
78 See id. (dismissing the public policy arguments and concluding that an expansion of the
current definition of seller is a decision for the Tennessee legislature).
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B. AMAZON IS NOT A BAILOR

When a third-party vendor participates in the FBA program,
plaintiffs argue that Amazon is a bailor of the defective product,79
which would make Amazon a “seller.” The general argument
advanced by plaintiffs—that is, holding a bailor accountable for a
defective product under the Restatement or a state product liability
statute—has support in the law. For example, Pennsylvania courts
apply § 402A of the Restatement to bailors and lessors,80 and the
Tennessee Products Liability Act defines “seller” to include “a lessor
or bailor engaged in the business of leasing or bailment of a
product.”81
Nonetheless, the bailment argument ultimately fails. A bailment
arises when the owner of the property (the bailor) temporarily
transfers custody of the property to another party (the bailee).82
Amazon cannot be a bailor because it is not the owner of the
products sold by third-party vendors. When a third-party vendor
participates in the FBA program, the third-party vendor retains
title to its products;83 Amazon simply stores the products and ships
the products upon purchase.84 Even if the relationship between
third-party vendors and Amazon creates a bailment, Amazon acts
as the bailee (not the bailor), and bailees do not fall within the
definition of a “product seller.”85 Consequently, Amazon is not a
bailor of the defective products sold on its marketplace.

79 See, e.g., id. (explaining the plaintiffs’ argument that Amazon was a bailor of the
allegedly defective hoverboard that triggered a fire that consumed their house and resulted
in physical and psychological injuries to the plaintiffs).
80 See Kalumetals, Inc. v. Hitachi Magnetics Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 510, 515 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
81 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (West 2018).
82 See Mark S. Dennison, Bailee’s Liability for Damage, Loss, or Theft or Bailed Property,
46 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 361 (1998) (explaining that parties in a bailment relationship
have some special purpose in mind that requires the transfer of possession of the particular
property and noting that a bailment can be express or implied).
83 See Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that
FBA participants retain title to their products).
84 See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–cv–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *2 (M.D. Tenn.
May 30, 2018) (explaining that FBA participants “place products in Amazon’s possession . . .
in an Amazon Fulfillment Center” and then Amazon ships the products once they are
purchased).
85 See id. at *8 (explaining in the alternative that if a bailment relationship did in fact
exist then Amazon is better categorized as the bailee of the defective hoverboard).
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C. AMAZON IS NOT A MERCHANT NOR A SELLER UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE

As an alternative to product liability theories, plaintiffs have
further attempted to hold Amazon liable using the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) and breach of warranty claims. The UCC
is a collection of proposed rules that seek to harmonize the law of
sales and commercial transactions across the United States.86 As a
model code, the UCC has the effect of law in a state only when it is
adopted by that state.87 Notably, all fifty states have adopted the
UCC either in whole or in part.88
Under the UCC’s definition, Amazon is not a seller. Professor
Prosser explains that the UCC was not “drawn with anything in
mind but a contract between a ‘seller’ and his immediate ‘buyer.’”89
Section 2-103 of the UCC defines “seller” as “a person who sells or
contracts to sell goods.”90 Further, while the passage of title might
hold talismanic significance in the ordinary meaning of a sale, the
UCC explicitly requires the passage of title for a sale to have
occurred: Section 2-106 of the UCC defines a “sale” as consisting of
“passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.”91 Notably,
Amazon never holds title to third-party vendors’ products, even
when the third-party vendor participates in the FBA program.92
Because Amazon lacks title to third-party vendors’ products, it is
incapable of conducting a sale of these products. For this reason,
Amazon cannot be classified as a seller under the UCC.
Nor is Amazon a merchant under the UCC. The UCC defines
“merchant” as:

86 See Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), DUKE LAW (Oct. 8, 2018, 8:44 AM),
https://law.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/ucc/ (explaining that the UCC is written by experts
in commercial law and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the ALI).
87 See id.
88 See id. (noting that the UCC has been adopted in some form in all fifty states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands).
89 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 655 (4th ed. 1971).
90 U.C.C. § 2103(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987).
91 Id. at § 2-106(1).
92 See Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that
FBA participants retain title to their products).
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a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge
or skill peculiar to the practice or goods involved in the
transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself
out as having such knowledge or skill.93
Given Amazon’s limited role in transactions between third-party
vendors and customers, Amazon does not fall within the definition
of a merchant. Amazon merely provides an online listing service
that connects third-party vendors with customers.94
Regardless of how plaintiffs attempt to categorize Amazon’s role
in the transaction between third-party vendors and customers on
the Amazon Marketplace, Amazon does not fit these
categorizations. In these transactions, Amazon is not a seller, a
bailor, nor a merchant and cannot be held liable for defective
products sold through its marketplace.
Interestingly, every court to consider the question of Amazon’s
liability has found that Amazon is not liable for defective products
sold on its marketplace.95 Consequently, a plaintiff attempting to
bring a claim against Amazon for defective products sold by
third-party vendors will encounter an emerging consensus against
construing Amazon as a seller. In the event plaintiffs recognize this
emerging consensus and thus bring other products-related tort
claims against Amazon, plaintiffs still face an uphill battle because
of the Communications Decency Act.
V. COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
With the advent of the Internet, a brave new world of free speech
emerged. In 1996, with the enactment of the Communications
Decency Act (CDA), Congress attempted to provide structure to the
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. § 2-104(1) (West 2018).
See McDonald v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533, 542 (D. Md. 2016) (concluding
that “Amazon’s role as the ‘platform’ for the third-party sales does not qualify it as a merchant
or a seller under Maryland’s UCC”).
95 See Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738 (FLW) (LHG), 2018 WL
3546197, at *10 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (listing judicial opinions from courts in other
jurisdictions that have found that Amazon is not liable).
93
94
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wild west of the World Wide Web.96 Because the legislation was
originally intended to curb indecent speech on the Internet, it is
rather surprising that § 230 of the CDA provides “one of the most
valuable tools for protecting freedom of expression and innovation
on the Internet.”97 Section 230’s broad grant of protection provides
a non-traditional defense for Amazon.
Section 230 provides in part that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”98 Essentially, § 230 creates federal immunity against
claims that service providers are liable for information originating
from a third-party user of the service.99 The Fourth Circuit
articulated the legislative purpose behind the enactment of § 230:
Interactive computer services have millions of users.
The amount of information communicated via
interactive computer services is therefore staggering.
The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific
speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would
be impossible for service providers to screen each of
their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced
with potential liability for each message republished by
their services, interactive computer service providers
might choose to severely restrict the number and type
of messages posted. Congress considered the weight of
the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize
service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.100
In fact, Congress explicitly listed policy objectives in the
legislation. Among other policy rationales, the CDA is intended “to
promote the continued development of the Internet” and “to
96 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, EFF, https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230
(last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
97 See id. (noting that the “original purpose of the legislation was to restrict free speech on
the Internet”).
98 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (West 2018).
99 See Jason Schossler, Amazon Seeks Dismissal of Insurer’s House Fire Subrogation
Action, WESTLAW J. INS. COVERAGE, Oct. 6, 2017, at *1 (explaining that Section 230 “provides
federal immunity against claims relating to third-party content on online marketplaces like
Amazon”).
100 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (West 2018).
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preserve the vibrant and competitive free market” of ideas on the
Internet.101
A split of authority exists on whether § 230 immunizes Amazon’s
conduct in these third-party transactions.102 Some courts have
expressed reluctance to find § 230 immunity because the Internet
has become widely available and “is no longer a fragile new means
of communication” like it was when Congress enacted the CDA.103
Consequently, these courts have become reluctant to dismiss tort
claims based on § 230 immunity. While these concerns are
reasonable in the abstract, they simply do not have a basis in the
law. The CDA does not contain a qualification that it only applies
when the Internet is new and vulnerable. Further, if Congress
wanted to amend the CDA to limit the § 230 immunity because of
the Internet’s dominant role in the communication and commerce
landscapes, it certainly has the power to do so. Notably, Congress
has chosen not to amend the CDA in this manner. This
congressional inaction can be viewed as legislative acquiescence.
While the theory of legislative acquiescence has received
criticism,104 it remains a viable argument for why courts should
continue to interpret § 230 the same way they have been despite the
now widespread availability of the Internet.
To determine whether claims are barred by § 230, courts
typically examine three factors: (1) whether the defendant is a
101 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(b) (explaining why Congress chose to develop a sphere of
immunity for providers of interactive computer services).
102 Compare, e.g., Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 502–03 (M.D. Pa.
2017) (concluding that Section 230 of the CDA does immunize Amazon because the plaintiff’s
claims were “attempting to hold Amazon liable for its role in publishing an advertisement for
The Furry Group’s product”) with McDonald v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533, 537
(D. Md. 2016) (concluding that Section 230 of the CDA does not immunize Amazon because
the plaintiff did “not necessarily seek to hold Amazon liable as a ‘publisher or speaker’”
because “the issue pivots around the battery itself, Amazon’s involvement in the sale of same,
and Amazon’s guarantee regarding its condition, regardless of how the battery was posted on
Amazon’s website”).
103 See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1164–65 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (explaining that the Internet’s “vast reach into the
lives of millions is exactly why [the court] must be careful not to exceed the scope of the
immunity provided by Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair advantage over
their real-world counterparts”).
104 See, e.g., Blair C. Warner, The Hypocrisy of the Acquiescence Canon (Mar. 24, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with BePress from the SelectedWorks of Blair C. Warner),
https://works.bepress.com/blair_warner/2/ (arguing that legislative acquiescence is based on
numerous faulty assumptions).
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provider of an interactive computer service;105 (2) whether the
postings at issue contain information provided by another
information content provider;106 and (3) whether the plaintiff’s
claims seek to treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of the
information.107 If a defendant meets all three elements of § 230, then
the claims against that defendant will be barred. Amazon easily
satisfies the first two elements—it is an “interactive computer
service” and the product listings at issue in these cases contain
information provided by third-parties.108
The analysis regarding the third element presents more of a
challenge. To determine whether a plaintiff seeks to treat Amazon
as the “publisher or speaker of . . . information provided by” a
third-party vendor, the court assesses whether the plaintiff’s claims
inherently require the court to treat the defendant as the publisher
or speaker of content provided by a third party.109 However, the
clear language of § 230 weighs heavily in favor of granting Amazon
immunity for content provided by third-party vendors.110 Courts

105 Section 230 defines “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system,
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (West 2018).
106 Section 230 defines “information content provider” as “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (West
2018).
107 See Hinton v. Amazon.com.dedc, LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 689 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (listing
the elements that courts generally provide when holding that the plaintiff’s claims are barred
by Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA).
108 See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (noting that
third-party vendors “provide a description (including, perhaps, a photograph) of the product
to Amazon” for the online product listing); see also Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
No. 17-2738 (FLW) (LHG), 2018 WL 3546197, at *8 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (explaining that
the Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement “does not provide Amazon the ability
to . . . exercise control over the online listing”).
109 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hat matters is
not the name of the cause of action—defamation versus negligence versus intentional
infliction of emotional distress—what matters is whether the cause of action inherently
requires the court to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by
another.”).
110 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (West 2018) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”).
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have generally accorded § 230 immunity a broad scope.111 Section
230 “precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a
computer service provider in a publisher’s role.”112 Courts have
interpreted publication to involve “reviewing, editing, and deciding
whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-party
content.”113 Importantly, the third-party vendors—not Amazon—
provide the content for the online product listings.114 Amazon
possesses editorial and publishing functions by “retain[ing] the
right to edit the content and determine the appearance of product
listings.”115 Courts have routinely rejected lawsuits in which
plaintiffs seek to treat defendants as a publisher or speaker of thirdparty content when the defendants merely edit and filter the thirdparty content.116 For these reasons, Amazon’s argument that
dismissal is mandated under § 230 of the CDA should prevail.
VI. CONCLUSION
As online shopping continues to boom, Amazon faces lawsuits
brought by plaintiffs who are injured by defective products sold by
third-party vendors on the Amazon Marketplace. As courts begin to
111 See Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 502 (noting the expansive reach of § 230 of the CDA);
see also Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Immunity Provisions of Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230, 52 A.L.R. Fed. 2d
37 (2011) (noting that “courts across the country have repeatedly held that the CDA’s grant
of immunity should be construed broadly”).
112 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
113 See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102 (explaining what publication entails and noting that “a
publisher reviews material submitted for publication, perhaps edits it for style or technical
fluency, and then decides whether to publish it”).
114 See Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (noting that third-party vendors provide the
information for the product’s online listing); see also Amazon Services Business Solutions
Agreement, supra note 21 (requiring third-party vendors to “promptly update . . . [the product
listing] information as necessary to ensure it at all times remains accurate and complete”).
115 See Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (explaining the limited amount of control Amazon
exerts over the product listings on its marketplace).
116 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (explaining that § 230 of the CDA bars “lawsuits seeking to
hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—
such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone[,] or alter content”); Nemet
Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining
that plaintiffs may not hold liable “the interactive computer service provider who merely
enables [third-party content] to be posted online”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339
F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that “the interactive service provider receives
full [§ 230] immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process” as long as the
third-party vendor “willingly provide[d] the essential published content”).
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hear these cases, the decisions have huge implications for Amazon
as well as other retailors that market third-party products on their
websites. In deciding these cases, courts will look to the Restatement
and the state’s product liability statute.
Based on Amazon’s role in the sale of third-party products,
plaintiffs attempt to categorize Amazon as a seller, bailor, or
merchant for purposes of liability. Amazon should not be
categorized as a seller for three reasons: (1) Amazon’s is a facilitator
of sales, not a seller; (2) Amazon does not exercise sufficient control
over the third-party vendors’ products to make it a seller; and (3)
subjecting Amazon to strict liability for third-party vendors’
defective products does not advance the policy behind product
liability laws. Further, Amazon should not be categorized as a bailor
because it is not the owner of the products sold by third-party
vendors. Lastly, Amazon should not be categorized as a merchant
under the UCC because Amazon plays a limited role in transactions
between third-party vendors and customers; it merely provides an
online listing service that connects third-party vendors with
customers.
Amazon can find immunity in § 230 of the CDA. Section 230
creates a federal immunity against claims that attempt to make
service providers liable for information originating from a
third-party user of the service. Importantly, the third-party
vendors, not Amazon, provide the information for the online product
listings. Amazon merely retains the ability to edit the online
product listing. Amazon will likely find success with this defense
because courts have routinely rejected lawsuits in which plaintiffs
seek to treat defendants as a publisher or speaker of third-party
content when the defendants merely edit and filter the third-party
content.
Notably, the few cases that have dealt with this issue have all
found that Amazon is not liable for defective products sold on its
marketplace. Therefore, while Amazon’s liability in these cases is a
relatively novel issue, plaintiffs who bring these claims in the future
will encounter an emerging consensus against holding Amazon
liable.
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